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'individual concern' and introduced the following criterion: 'A natural or legal person
is to be regarded as individually concerned by a Community measure of general
application that concerns him directly if the measure in question affects his legal
position, in a manner which is both definite and immediate, by restricting his rights or
by imposing obligations on him. The number and position of other persons who are
likewise affected by the measure, or who may be so, are of no relevance in that regard.'
The Court of First Instance had clearly been inspired by the Opinion of Advocate
General Jacobs in the case Unidn de Pequeftos Agricultores (Case C-50/00 P). The latter
case concerns the appeal before the ECJ against a decision of the CFI in which the CFI
had applied the strict interpretation of Article 230 fourth paragraph EC and declared
the action inadmissible. The ECJ decided to hear in plenary session with a view to
reconsidering its case-law on individual concern. In his Opinion of 21 March 2002 AG
Jacobs advised the ECJ to give the 'individual concern' criterion a broader definition.
In its decision in Uni6n de Pequefios Agricultores of 25 July 2002, the ECJ made it clear
that - unlike Jacobs and the CFI - it is not willing to broaden its definition of the criteria
for access to Court for individuals. It uphold the Plaumann doctrine and made it clear
that Treaty amendment is necessary in order to improve the system of judicial
protection within the European Union.
I THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
In the previous issue of EU human rights news, reference has been made to the
'European Convention' that has been convened to discuss the future of the European
Union. In the mean time, six working groups have been established dealing with the
following topics: Subsidiarity, Charter/ECHR, Legal Personality, National Parliaments,
Complementary Competencies and Economic Governance (http:/european-
convention.eu.int/docwg.asp?lang= EN). Each working group is given a specific
mandate. The working group 'Charter/ECHR', for example, is asked to address the
following questions: 'If it is decided to incorporate the Charter of Fundamental Rights
in the Treaty: how should this be done and what would be the consequences? What
would be the implications of accession by the Community/Union to the European
Convention on Human Rights?'. On 18 June 2002, the secretariat of the Convention




The present report covers decisions issued by the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, which reflect new issues in the case law of the Inter-American System. In that
respect, the first case, Cantos vs Argentina, addresses the rights of individuals whose
interests are entangled with those of corporations. The Commission has consistently
rejected cases in which the interests of corporations were at stake, alleging that the
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American Convention only protects 'human beings' and not legal entities. The Court
appears to have established an exception to such a rule. The second case, Las Palmeras
vs Colombia, involves issues related to the international responsibility of a State once that
State has awarded monetary compensation to victims in the domestic jurisdiction and
to evidentiary problems faced to prove the State's responsibility in cases of alleged
summary executions. Finally, the report covers the decision on the merits in the case
Hilaire et al. vs Trinidad and Tobago. The decision on the preliminary objections in this
case was reported in June 2001. Hilaire et. al. addresses the issue of the mandatory
application of the death penalty in murder cases in Trinidad and Tobago. The full text
of the reported decisions can be found on the website of the Inter-American Court at
www.corteidh.or.cr.
It is important to note that the Inter-American Court recently issued Advisory
Opinion 17 in which it addressed the scope of Article 19 of the American Convention,
which protects the rights of children, in relation to the right to a fair trial and the right
to an effective remedy protected under Articles 8 and 25 of that treaty. The content of
this opinion will be reported in future presentations.
Cantos vs Argentina Case, Judgment of 7 September 2001
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter 'the Commission')
submitted this case against Argentina (hereinafter 'the State') alleging violations of the
rights ofJos6 Maria Cantos, the owner of a business group in the province of Santiago
del Estero. In 1972, the Revenue Department of the Province investigated Mr. Cantos'
companies for alleged violations of the Stamp Act. During the investigation, the
Revenue Department searched and seized the company's documents. The company's
lack of access to its documents caused them to incur financial losses. Mr. Cantos filed
several lawsuits to defend his company's rights; as a result, the State agents harassed him
and subjected him and his family to 'systematic persecution'. In 1982, Mr. Cantos
reached an agreement with the government of the Province, in which the government
acknowledged its debts towards his company and established a system of payment. The
government did not comply with its agreement and, as a result, Mr. Cantos filed a
petition against the province and the State before the Supreme Court of Justice. In
1996, the Supreme Court rejected the petition and required Mr. Cantos to pay the costs
of the proceedings.
The Commission assessed Mr. Cantos' petition and concluded that the State had
violated the right to a fair trail, the right tojudicial protection, and the right to property
as stipulated respectively in Articles 8, 25, and 21 of the American Convention. The
Commission requested the Court to re-establish the rights of Jos6 Maria Cantos and
provide adequate reparation for the violations stated above.
The State filed two preliminary objections: 1) in regard to the Court's competence
to hear the case and 2) in regard to the terms by which the State recognised the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. The State argued that the Court could not hear
the complaint because the case alleged violations against a legal entity, which is not
explicitly protected under the American Convention. Article 1(1) of the Convention
provides that State Parties undertake to respect and ensure to all 'persons' subject to
their jurisdiction the exercise of the rights protected therein. The State highlighted
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Article 1(2) of that treaty, which states that '[flor the purposes of this Convention,
"person" means every human being'. To support its arguments, the State cited
consistent jurisprudence developed by the Commission according to which the
Convention only protects the rights of individuals, thereby excluding the possibility for
corporations to be considered victims under that treaty. The Court rejected this
objection and observed that the rights and obligations attributed to companies generally
become the rights and obligations of persons comprising or acting on behalf of the
company. The Court recalled the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and
concluded that the State's interpretations would imply denying the human rights
protection of the American Convention to an important group, which would lead to
unreasonable results. The Court concluded that the human rights protection of the
American Convention, under specific circumstances, extends to individuals whose rights
are 'encompassed in a legal figure or fiction created by the same system of law', such as
when the rights of individual shareholders in a corporation are violated. For those
individuals to claim violations under the Convention, however, it appears that the Court
requires that they must exhaust domestic remedies 'in their own name', that is to say,
challenging violations to their personal rights, in addition to those of the company.
The State's second objection was based on the terms by which it accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. On 5 September 1984, the State ratified the
American Convention and recognised the Court's jurisdiction subject to the limitation
that its obligations 'would only take effect with regard to acts that occurred after the
ratification of the said instrument'. Since the events of Mr. Cantos' case took place
before 5 September 1984, the State argued that the Court could not address the
violations. In response, the Court recalled the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which states that the provisions of a treaty 'do not bind a party in relation to
any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date
of the entry into force of the treaty...' Thus, the Court concluded that it could only
exercisejurisdiction over the proceedings of Mr. Cantos' case that took place after 1984.
Without significant reasoning, the Court rejected the argument advanced by the
Commission according to which the facts of the case showed the existence of a denial
ofjustice, which in turn constituted a continuous violation of several rights protected by
the Convention, particularly the rights to a fair trial, to an effective remedy and to
property. The Court will continue hearings and processing of the instant case.
Las Palmeras vs Colombia Case, Judgment of 6 December 2001
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights submitted this case on behalf of
seven civilians killed as a result of an armed operation conducted by the Colombian
National Police in a place known as Las Palmeras. The Commission argued that
Colombia (hereinafter 'the State') violated Articles 4, 8 and 25 of the American
Convention, which protect the right to life, the right to a fair trial and the right to
judicial protection, all in relation to Article 1(1) of that treaty.
Initially, the Commission petitioned the Court to declare that the State had violated
the right to life, recognised in Article 4 of the American Convention and Article 3 of the
Geneva Convention to the detriment of Artemio Pantoja Ord6fiez, Hernin Javier
Cuardn, Julio Milciades Cer6n G6mez, Edebraiz Cer6n Rojas, Wilian Hamilton Cer6n
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Rojas, Mois6s Ojeda, and Herndn LizcanoJacanamejoy. The Court, in its decision on
preliminary objections, ruled that it does not have jurisdiction to apply international
humanitarian law; therefore, only the violation of Article 4 of the American Convention
remained to be decided. The State acknowledged international responsibility for the
death of six of the victims, but challenged the allegations of the Commission stating that
State agents also arbitrarily deprived Mr. Lizcano Jacanamejoy of his life.
In spite of the State's concession, the Court concluded that it did not have to decide
if Colombia had violated Article 4 of the American Convention for the deaths of five of
the alleged victims, because domestic administrative courts had already found the State
responsible and had ordered payments of compensation to the victims' kin. The
Commission argued that these rulings determined the State's domestic violations and
that the Court must assess the State's international responsibility for the violations of the
right to life. The Court rejected this argument and concluded that the Colombian
courts' rulings had become resjudicata. In relation to the sixth alleged victim, Mois6s
Ojeda, the Court accepted the State's acknowledgement and therefore established that
it had violated Article 4 of the American Convention.
The State argued that the seventh person, Hernin Lizcano Jacanamejoy, died in
combat. The Commission contested this conclusion advancing three arguments to prove
the State's violation of Article 4 of the American Convention with respect to this
particular victim.
First, the Commission urged the Court to shift the burden of proof to the State to
demonstrate that it had not violated Article 4 to the detriment of Hernan Lizcano
Jacanamejoy, arguing that the victim was on the custody of State agents when he died.
The Court decided that reversing the burden of proof was not within its discretion, but
'it is dictated by the rules of law in force'. Moreover, it stated that to prove Colombia's
responsibility in this case, the Commission must show that State agents executed the
victim. It is not clear from the decision of the Court if it set a new rule of evidence
according to which, to prove summary executions in the future, victims will be required
to provide direct evidence. If so, such a requirement will definitely constitute a step back
for the protection of human rights in the region and a departure from the Court's
previous case law.
The Commission also argued that Colombia had not conducted a serious
investigation of the events that led to the alleged victim's death and, therefore, its
omission constituted a failure to guarantee the victim's right to life. The Court rejected
this contention alleging that the rule advocated by the Commission could only apply if
no serious investigation was carried out by the State. In the present case, such an
argument could not be sustained because there were two judgments from the
Administrative Law Court of Colombia's Council of State, which found the State
responsible for the events that transpired at Las Palmeras with respect to five of the
alleged victims in this case. In addition, since 1998, the State has embarked on a
criminal investigation to establish the responsibility of the perpetrators of the
executions alleged in this case.
Finally, the Commission urged the Court to hold that the evidence produced in this
case was sufficient to prove that State agents summarily executed Hernin Lizcano
Jacanamejoy. In this respect, it argued that the State's conclusion regarding the death
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of the victim was based on the testimony of officers who participated in the operation,
which was not credible evidence. In addition, the State authorities failed to carry out
procedures essential for the determination of the cause of death of the victim, such as
collecting the sh'ells and bullets at the site where he was killed or taking scrapings from
his hands to establish if he had fired a weapon. Furthermore, the expert tests
conducted, coupled with the 'unmistakable signs of the modus operandi used by agents
of the security forces', are unequivocal proof that the victim was defenseless when
executed and in custody of the State. The Court analysed the results of the tests on
which the Commission based its arguments, in particular the anthropological analysis
and forensic examination carried out on the victim's remains once the exhumation of
his body took place, and decided that no conclusive evidence could be drawn from the
reports elaborated by expert witnesses. The Court also concluded that a study of the
shrapnel present in the alleged victim's remains was not sufficient to lead the Court to
conclude that the State executed Hernan Lizcano Jacanamejoy. Therefore, the Court
found no violation of Article 4 of the American Convention in relation to this victim.
The Commission also argued that the State violated Articles 8 and 25 of the
American Convention, which ensure the right to a fair trial and the right to judicial
protection. In assessing this claim, the Court reviewed the proceeding that took place
in Colombia with regard to the armed operation in which the alleged victims were
killed. First, the Office of Investigation and Discipline of the Putumayo Police
Department Command instituted disciplinary proceedings against the officers involved
in the armed operation. These proceedings lasted 5 days and the investigating officer
cleared all participants of the operation ofwrongdoings. The Court concluded that the
hasty investigation did not allow ajust examination of the evidence and that the officer
who acted as a judge' lacked the impartiality required by the due process rights ensured
by the American Convention.
In addition, the military criminal proceedings began in 1991 and the case remained
in the military justice system until 1998 when it was transferred to the ordinary criminal
justice system. The Court reiterated that in a democratic State respectful of the rule of
law, the military criminal system must be restricted and exceptional in scope, and
intended to try military personnel only for crimes or misdemeanors related to acts of
military service. According to the Court, when military courts assert jurisdiction over
cases that should be heard by regular tribunals, the right to have access to a competent,
independent and impartial judge is violated. In light of this analysis, the Court stated
that the alleged victims' cases should have been submitted to an ordinary court initially,
reiterated that the investigation was pending for seven years, and that the military
courts failed to identify, prosecute, and convict the parties responsible for the Las
Palmeras killings. Thus, the Court concluded that the State violated Article 8(1) of the
American Convention, which recognises the right of the victims' next of kin to a hearing
by a competent, impartial and independent court.
In regard to the proceedings in the ordinary criminal justice system, which began in
1998, the Court noted that the criminal investigation of these events have been taking
place for more than ten years. This was not a reasonable time under the standards set
in the American Convention, particularly taking into account previous cases in which
the Court has ruled that a proceeding that lasted five years since it was instituted
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violated that treaty. Moreover, the State's failure to carry out a proper investigation to
identify and punish the perpetrators of the victims' executions affected the rights of the
victims' relatives to have access to an effective remedy. Thus, the Court held the State
liable for violating Articles 8(1) and 25(1) of the American Convention.
The Court ordered that the reparation phase be initiated and authorised its
President to take the necessary measures toward that effect.
Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. vs Trinidad and Tobago Case, Judgment of 21 June
2002
The Courtjoined the Hilaire, Constantine et al. and Benjamin et al., cases that the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights submitted separately against Trinidad and
Tobago (hereinafter 'State'). The State convicted the 32 alleged victims in these cases
of murder and sentenced them to execution under the Offences against the Person Act.
This Act proscribes the death penalty as the only applicable sentence for the crime of
murder. In the majority of cases, the appeals submitted by the alleged victims to the
Court of Appeals of Trinidad and Tobago and to the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council were dismissed. The Constitution of the State precludes individuals from
challenging the constitutionality of laws or acts carried out pursuant to any law in force
in Trinidad and Tobago before 1976, the year in which the Constitution came into
force. Additionally, it did not include a trial within a reasonable time as a part of its due
process guarantees.
By applying Article 63(2), the Court adopted provisional measures to delay the
execution of several alleged victims in order to allow the Commission and later itself to
assess their petitions. Trinidad and Tobago failed to provide information requested by
the Court regarding the implementation of the provisional measures. In addition, on
4 June 4 1999, the State executed Joey Ramiah, who was among those protected by the
measures issued by the Court.
The Commission argued that the State violated its international obligations under
the American Convention in relation to the following issues: the 'mandatory nature' of
the death penalty; the delays in the criminal proceedings; the denial of access to legal
aid and other due process violations; the deficiencies in the treatment and conditions
of detention; and the lack of an effective procedure for issuing amnesty, pardon or
commutation of sentence. The Commission also argued that the execution of Joey
Ramiah while his petition was pending before the inter-American human rights system,
violated the victims' rights under the American Convention.
Trinidad and Tobago ratified the American Convention and recognised the
compulsoryjurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 1991. In 1998,
it denounced the Convention. Pursuant to Article 78 of that instrument, the
denunciation became effective as of 1999. Since the facts of the present case occurred
before the date the denunciation became effective, the Court asserted its jurisdiction
over the case.
The State challenged the jurisdiction of the Court alleging that its instrument of
acceptance of the mandatory jurisdiction of the Court contained a limitation that
prevented this tribunal from reviewing this case. The Court, in its judgment on
preliminary objections, rejected the State's by holding that the limitation included in the
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acceptance of its jurisdiction was incompatible with the object and purpose of the
American Convention and therefore invalid [for more information on this decision, see
report on the Inter-American System published in this review in June 2001]. The State
failed to appear before the Court for the remainder of the proceedings.
On the merits of the case, the Commission and the petitioners first argued that the
mandatory imposition of the death penalty, without considering the mitigating and
aggravating circumstances of each case and the absence of judicial discretion in the
application of the sentence, was a violation of Articles 4(1), 4(2), 5(1), 5(2) and 8(1), in
relation to Article 1(1) of the American Convention.
The Court found that the Offences against the Person Act, which mandates the
application of the death penalty for murder disregarding the fact that this crime may
have different degrees of seriousness, prevents the judicial authority from considering
the basic circumstances in establishing the degree of culpability and individualising the
sentence. Thereby, the Act violates Article 4(1) that ensures the right not to be arbitrarily
deprived of life. In addition, by mechanically applying the death penalty to all persons
found guilty of murder without judicial review of such application, the Act violates
Article 4(2) of the Convention, which limits the imposition of this punishment only to
the most serious crimes.
Also, under the general obligation of Article 2, State Parties to the American
Convention must implement the necessary changes to ensure that domestic laws comply
with their obligations under this treaty. Thus, the Court found that the mere existence
of the Offences against the Person Act is a per se violation of this provision.
Second, the Commission and the plaintiffs argued that the unjustified delays in
bringing some of the alleged victims in the present case to trial constituted a violation
of Articles 7(5) and 8(1) of the American Convention. Also, the State's Constitution did
not guarantee a trial within a reasonable time, demonstrating the State's failure to
institute legislation to guarantee the standards of the American Convention in breach
of Article 2 of that treaty. In addition, the Commission and the petitioners claimed that
the State failed to provide effective legal aid to permit some of the alleged victims to
bring constitutional motions before domestic tribunals, thereby violating Articles 8, 25,
and 1(1) of the Convention.
To determine the issue of trial within a reasonable time, the Court traditionally
follows a three-fold test initially developed by the European system, according to which
the complexity of the case, the procedural activity of the interested party, and the
conduct of the judicial authorities are to be taken into account to establish the
reasonableness of a proceeding. In the case under analysis, however, the Court appears
to have decided that the prolonged delay in the victims' trials, in itself, constituted a
violation of the right to be tried within a reasonable time as provided for in Articles 7(5)
and 8(1) of the American Convention. In addition, the domestic laws in Trinidad and
Tobago do not recognise the right to trial within a reasonable time, thereby
demonstrating that the State failed to bring its legislation into compliance with the
standards of the American Convention. Thus, the Court ruled that the State violated
Articles 7(5) and 8(1), in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 of that treaty.
The Court also found sufficient evidence to conclude that the alleged victims did not
have access to adequate legal assistance for the effective presentation of constitutional
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motions challenging violations to their basic due process rights. Though the laws of
Trinidad and Tobago ensure the right to present constitutional motions, the State
impeded the effective use of this remedy by failing to provide appropriate legal aid to
the alleged victims. Therefore, the State was in breach of the rights to a fair trial and to
an effective remedy as protected by Articles 8 and 25, in relation to Article 1(1) of the
American Convention.
Finally, the Court also drew attention to the fact that the Constitution ofTrinidad and
Tobago provides that no law in force prior to the adoption of the State's Constitution of
1976 may be the object of a constitutional challenge. The Court reasoned that the law
at issue in this case, the Offences against the Person Act, 'is incompatible with the
Convention and thus any provision that establishes that Act's immunity from challenge
is likewise incompatible, by virtue of the fact that Trinidad and Tobago (...) cannot
invoke provisions of its domestic law as justification for failure to comply with its
international obligations'.
Third, the Commission and the petitioners asserted that the inhumane conditions of
the detention centers constituted a violation ofArticles 5(1) and 5(2), in connection with
Article 1(1) of the American Convention. These articles protect the physical, mental, and
moral integrity of a person. They also prohibit, inter alia, cruel, inhumane, or degrading
punishment or treatment, mandate the segregation of the convicted and accused, and
obligate the State to make an attempt to reform the accused.
On the basis of the expert testimony submitted by the Commission and the
petitioners, the Court concluded that the conditions in the detention facilities impinged
on the physical and moral integrity of the alleged victims. These conditions, which
affected the alleged victims before and after they were convicted, constituted cruel,
inhumane and degrading treatment in violation of Articles 5(1) and 5(2), in relation to
Article 1(1) of the American Convention.
Finally, the Commission and the petitioners claimed that the State did not provide
an effective procedure for granting amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentences,
thereby violating Article 4(6) of the American Convention. This article grants persons
sentenced to death the additional right to request amnesty, pardon, or commutation of
sentence before a competent authority. The State's Constitution provides for an Advisory
Committee on the Power of Pardon in charge of considering and making
recommendations to the Minister of Natural Security as to whether a person sentenced
to death should benefit from the President's discretionary power of amnesty, pardon or
commutation of sentence. However, the domestic law does not prescribe guidelines for
the authorities to exercise that discretion and does not guarantee offenders an effective
opportunity to participate in the process.
The Court concluded that the State lacked procedural standards to ensure the alleged
victims' right to request amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence. The individual
mercy petitions recognised in the State's Constitution should be exercised trough fair
and adequate procedures that respect minimum due process rights as prescribed in
Articles 4(6) and 8 of the American Convention. These provisions place a positive duty
on the State to implement a fair and transparent procedure to ensure that persons
sentenced to death may submit all favourable evidence and effectively participate in such
a procedure. Since Trinidad and Tobago's procedure for granting mercy was
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characterised by a lack of transparency, lack of available information, and lack of
participation by the victims, the Court found that the State had violated Articles 4(6) and
8, in connection with Article 1(1) of that treaty.
As stated earlier, the Court issued a provisional measure, requesting the State to
preserve the life ofJoey Ramiah while his case was pending in the Commission and later
in the Court. The State failed to comply and executed the alleged victim. The Court held
that this action constituted an arbitrary deprivation of the right to life, thereby violating
Article 4 of the American Convention. In its assessments, the Court reiterated that the
State may not invoke provisions of its domestic law tojustify a failure to comply with its
international obligations.
With respect to reparations awarded under Article 63(1), the Court held that the State
must refrain from the future application of the Offences against the Person Act. Also, in
accordance with Article 2 of the American Convention the State must bring its laws into
compliance with this treaty and international human rights norms within a reasonable
time. The State must undertake legislative reform to establish different categories of
murder that account for the particular circumstances of the crime and the offender. The
Court also ordered that once reforms are implemented, the alleged victims should be
retried in light of the new legislation. In addition, the Advisory Committee must
resubmit the cases of the victims to the authority competent to render a decision on
mercy, which should be conducted in accordance with the due process guaranteed in the
American Convention. Furthermore, as part of the reparations, the Court held that
regardless of the outcome of the new trials, the State should refrain from executing the
victims. Moreover, the Court ordered the State to bring prison conditions into
compliance with the relevant international human rights norms.
Additionally, the Court awarded USD 50,000 to the wife and son ofJoey Ramiah and
USD 10,000 to his mother as compensation, on the ground of equity, for the arbitrary
deprivation of his life while he was under the protection of provisional measures issued
by the Court. Finally, the Court awarded the total sum of USD 13,000 for the expenses
incurred by the representatives of the victims in the course of the international
proceedings before the Court.
V AFRICA
RACHEL MURRAY
I ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY/AFRICAN UNION
The Council of Ministers met at their 7 6 th Ordinary Session in Durban, South Africa,
from 28 June - 6 July 2002. During this session they held a Special Session on the
African Union from I - 2 July to finalise the transformation of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) so far, examining the Draft Rules of
Procedure of the Assembly, Executive Council and Permanent Representatives'
Committee and Statutes of the Commission; and considering the Mechanism for Conflict
under the OAU. The deliberations of the Ordinary Session resulted in a number of
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